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COMMENTARY
GOALS, MEANS, AND PROBLEMS FOR
MODERN TORT LAW: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR PRIEST
ROBERT F. BLOMQUIST*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently in these pages, Professor George Priest fashioned a provoca-
tive article that he called Modern Tort Law and its Reform.' It was an
article of remarkable ambition for it contained both an attack on several
time-honored "presuppositions of modern tort law," 2 in addition to an argu-
ment for his "vision"s of a "unified' '4 theory of American tort law. Indeed,
tort reform is an issue that has received intensive scrutiny in recent times
by scholars, state legislatures, Congress, and study commissions.5 For Pro-
* Associate Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law.
1. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U.L. REV. 1 (1987).
2. Id. at 6.
3. Id. at 36.
4. id. at 6.
5. See, e.g., Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma
of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845 (1987); Symposium: Alternative Compensation
Schemes and Tort Theory, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 548 (1985); Phillips, In Defense of the Tort
System, 27 ARIz. L. REV. 603 (1985); Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law
and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281 (1980).
For articles focusing on mass toxic tort issues, see, e.g., Weinstein, The Role of the Court
in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 GEO. L.J. 1389 (1985); Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The
Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985); Epstein,
The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 475 (1984);
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Tort Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort
System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Special Project: An Analysis of the Legal, Social and
Political Issues Raised by the Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 573 (1983); and
Trouberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic
Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177 (1983).
The best known recent study on tort reform is American Bar Association, Report of the
Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System (1987). See id. at 46-51 for citation
to other study reports on tort reform. For state statutory reform proposals, see Selected State
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fessor Priest, the issue of tort reform has dominated his writings during the
last few years.6
The foundation for Priest's plea that "modern tort law must be vastly
reorganized, but in a manner much different than the weak and limited
efforts of recent tort reform legislation" 7 is his view that the purpose of
modern American tort law should be limited to a single goal: "reduc[tion
of] the accident rate as much as is practicable .. *"8 In this regard Priest
contends that the "provi[sion of] a sensible and coherent system of compen-
sation insurance for those unfortunate individuals who suffer product- or
service-related accidents"9 has been a secondary goal of tort law since 1960.
But, in his view, "[tihe time has come to reject the insurance function of
tort law and to focus the law on the important goal of accident
prevention."10
Professor Priest attempts to support his vision by asserting three paral-
lel arguments. First, he contends that the historical record indicates that
the courts and scholars have been preoccupied during the last three decades
with the ends of accident reduction and compensation insurance. This pre-
occupation has been to the virtual exclusion of other goals such as correc-
tive justice or retribution. 1 Second, and in his view, "a stronger reason than
the historical" rationale is the normative judgment that "[a]ccident reduc-
tion and insurance are the only important economic effects a legal rule can
Legislative Action Re: Affordability and Availability of Liability Insurance, NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 4, 1986). For a history of congressional consideration
of a preemptive federal tort reform statute, see D. KOPPELMAN, FEDERAL PRODUCT LIABILITY
REFORM (1987). For previous tort reform measures undertaken in reaction to the perceived
"medical malpractice insurance crisis" of the 1970s, see generally Redish, Legislative Re-
sponse to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L.
REV. 759 (1977); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Mal-
practice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417; Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation -
A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV. 655 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521 (1987); Priest, Compensation for Personal Injury in the United States, in INTERNA-
TIONAL COLLOQUIUM ON COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY (J. Hellner ed. 1987); Priest,
Modern Products Liability Law and Its Influence on the Accident Rate, in BROOKINGS INSTI-
TUTION CIVIL LIABILITY PROJECT (Litan & Winston eds. 1987); Priest, The Invention of En-
terprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985); Priest, Law and Economics and Law Reform: A Comment on
Barth's Cancer Compensation Proposal, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 587 (1984); Priest, Punitive Dam-
ages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 123 (1982); Priest, A Theory of the Con-
sumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981).
7. Priest, supra note 1, at 6.
8. Id. at 5. See also id. at 22.
9. Id. at 5.
10. Id. at 38.
11. Id. at 8-9.
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have." '12 Priest advances this point despite "some increasing attention in
modern decisions to employing [tort] liability rules" for other economic
purposes such as "[1] affect[ing] the level of injurer activity by internal-
izing costs [or] . .. [2] establish[ing] incentives for safety-related innova-
tion." 13 According to Professor Priest, these latter economic objectives are
both "highly speculative" and "overwhelmed by the more easily demon-
strated and empirically more substantial effects on the accident rate and on
insurance."14 Third, Priest's sanguine assessment of the efficiency of private
first-party insurance in the United States," joined with an appraisal of
American tort law as "the least advanced, most costly and least effective
insurance regime of the world,"' 6 justifies restricting the scope of tort liabil-
ity to the monolithic goal of accident prevention.
From this ideological foundation of narrow ends for modern tort law,
Priest goes on to criticize its means. In this respect, he notes that "the im-
plementation of the goals, rather than the goals themselves, generates the
problems of modern tort law." 17 Specifically, his analysis assumes that the
real problems of recent tort jurisprudence "stem from two sources."'" The
first source of problems is a "poor fit" between the goals of modern tort law
and "the formal law through which these goals were expressed,"' exempli-
fied by the strict liability approach of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 0 and causation rules in toxic tort cases.2 The second
source of problems are faulty "empirical presuppositions" underlying the
goals of accident reduction and compensation insurance - "[tihat the cor-
porate provider is always in a better position than the consumer both to
prevent injury and to provide insurance for injuries that cannot be pre-
vented."" As a consequence of these perceived shortcomings, Professor
Priest concludes that "modern law is much less effective than it might be in
12. Id. at 9 (original emphasis). See also infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
13. Priest, supra note 1, at 9 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elklhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,
18, 19 (1975), and G. PRIEST, INTERNALIZING CosTs (1987) (unpublished manuscript), on the
issue of cost internalization, and Beshada v. Johns Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447
A.2d 539 (1982), on the issue of safety-related innovation).
14. Id. (citing Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy:
Toxic Substances and The Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689 (1985)).
15. Id. at 37.
16. Id. at 38.
17. id. at 10.
18. Id.
19. Id. (footnote omitted).
20. See id. at 23-33 where Priest addresses standards of product liability law under
three subheadings: (1) a standard for manufacturing defects; (2) a standard for issues of prod-
uct design; and (3) the manufacturer's duty to warn.
21. Id. at 33-36.
22. Id. at 10. According to Priest: "[T]hese presuppositions impair the ability of modern
law to effectively reduce the accident rate and to provide for injury compensation." Id. See
also Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, supra note 6.
1988]
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creating incentives to reduce the injury rate" while it has also "disrupted
liability insurance markets and has led to a reduction in the total level of
accident insurance available in the society.""3
By probing the intellectual underpinnings of American tort law, Mod-
ern Tort Law and its Reform contributes in several respects to a better
understanding of the logic and limits of tort theory during the last three
decades. First, Professor Priest properly advocates - albeit from a flawed
perspective24 - analyzing modern tort doctrine in an instrumentalist man-
ner. Thus, he appears to agree with the general observation of Professor
Robert Summers that laws should be conceptualized and evaluated as "es-
sentially a set of means to be used in the service of social goals (which, in
turn, derive from conventional wants and interests). 2 5 Indeed, an instru-
mentalist approach - properly understood - is more likely to yield rele-
vant insights about the desirability of a particlar legal precept than the pur-
poseless findings of analytical positivists or historical jurists who assume
that legal rules are merely self-justifying or evolutionary by their very na-
ture.2 6 Second, Priest deserves praise for giving attention to the "relatively
neglected topic" of "means-goal relations '2  by beginning the process of
rethinking the nature of tort law's goals and goal structures. While his
analysis - as discussed below28 - is impeded by a misunderstanding of
the complex nature of worthy goals for tort law, it provides interesting new
hypotheses about the potentialities of insurance markets, and the accounta-
bility of consumers for preventing accidents .2  Third, Professor Priest is
right in criticizing the "crazyquilt" characteristic of recent tort reform
23. Priest, supra note 1, at 10.
24. See infra notes 37-57 and 67-71 and accompanying text.
25. R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 61 (1982) (citation
omitted).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
29. Professor Priest does not devote enough attention, however, to systemic weaknesses
of the insurance industry. To the contrary, Priest is a strong advocate of the efficiency and
desirability of insurance companies in managing societal risk. See Priest, The Current Insur-
ance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, supra note 6. But other commentators have suggested that
serious systemic problems prevail in modern insurance markets. See sources cited infra notes
86-91. See also REPORT OF THE ACTION COMMISSION TO IMPROVE THE TORT LIABILITY SYS-
TEM, supra note 5, at 7-10 (recommending, inter alia, further study of whether the insurance
industry's system of rating premiums should be regulated; whether mandatory limitations on
cancellation and non-renewal of insurance policies are warranted under some circumstances;
whether there should be federal regulation of some or all aspects of insurance markets;
whether the antitrust exemption for insurance companies should be repealed or modified; and,
whether there should be legal requirements that information and data about the insurance
industry and its experience be available to the public beyond what is now available from insur-
ance companies and public sources of information).
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measures."0 Indeed, if fundamental change is really warranted in liability
and damage rules, it would be more appropriate for lawmakers to effect
comprehensive, consistent, and balanced reform rather than to engage in
piecemeal tinkering. Finally, Priest's notion of the "teaching and informing
opportunity" for tort law s' presents intriguing implications for future legal
reform, while at the same time remaining consistent with one of the most
important moral purposes of the law in general.8 2
30. Priest, supra note 1, at 4.
31. Id. at 12.
32. The educational function of law is masterfully discussed in the chapter Learning
Under Law in S. BUCHANAN, So REASON CAN RULE: REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND POLITICS
(1982). According to Professor Buchanan, the rule of law and self-government is inextricably
linked with education of the citizenry and, therefore, with public virtue. His comments about
the teaching function of the common law and American constitutional law are particularly
instructive:
The peculiar genius of this body of law [the common law] and the story of its develop-
ment over several centuries of vital human experience and learning has often enough been
described and celebrated. Lay judges sitting by the side of the road were under an oak
tree to hear, judge, and advise on their neighbor's feuds and causes, then calling juries to
extend and refine their intelligences; early opinions being cited as precedents for judging
new cases; such opinions being tested and probed as much as the parties in conflict; the
whole community remembering and anticipating judgment by peers as its members go
about their daily business - we forget this fabric of our lives when, as we say, we avoid
tangling with the law.
Id. at 22.
The oldest and most popular jurisprudence has said that law is a rule or command of
reason promulgated by an authority for the common good. A parody on this is: a law is a
command by the more powerful to coerce the weaker. American jurisprudence is famous
for a more pragmatic view, that laws are rules agreed to by the people to further their
social purposes. No doubt, each of these implies a recognizable theory and a method of
education. But there is another dictum, that laws are questions asked by God, history,
nature, or society to be answered by man individually and collectively. This formulation
penetrates to the heart of human freedom. It says that no law, not even divine law,
cancels out human freedom; the answer can be yes or no, or something else. It also tacitly
warns of the consequences of the answer. But primarily it forces the human being to
think about ends, or purposes. Law therefore provides a kind of complete Socratic teach-
ing and learning, so that under self-government men can teach themselves, if they will
learn to make good, questioning laws.
Id. at 35-36.
It would seem that the American Constitution was written to keep the controversy [about
the purposes of government] alive; that is, to allow readings that will justify those who
wish minimal government and also those who wish a maximal government, or even a
government within which both readings are combined to continue the theoretical and
practical debate by checks and balances. The Constitution and the laws that are made
pursuant to it keep a dialogue of questions and answers going. Government, for us, is a
continuous dialectic about the means and ends of common life.
Id. at 37.
Query: If we were, as Professor Priest urges us, to cause "[tlhe insurance function ... [to] be
excised from tort law altogether," Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law,
supra note 6, at 1588-89, with a single-minded focus on accident reduction, what would this
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In spite of its positive attributes, Priest's vision of modern tort law is
clouded. Part II of this piece describes, in a general way, the misinformed
and incomplete aspects of his accident prevention model that tend to neg-
lect or underplay the rich diversity and complicated interaction of the ends
and means of American tort law. Part III will then illustrate the weak-
nesses of Priest's approach by discussing its deficiencies as applied to one of
the most troublesome policy issues facing our society today: injuries suf-
fered by human beings from exposure to hazardous substances.
II. ANALYTICAL SHORTCOMINGS OF PRIEST'S VISION
First, a major shortcoming at the threshold of Priest's conception of
modern tort law is the "limits of the efficiency criterion" 33 associated with
his purely economic analysis of tort law. Despite an attempt to distance his
approach from past economic analyses of tort law" by asserting that acci-
dent prevention should be the exclusive concern of modern tort law, he
makes a quintessential assumption that economic efficiency, or effective-
ness,3 5 should be of paramount social concern in all contexts. But, as noted
by Professor G. Edward White in a similar critique of other economic tort
theorists:
The question raised by [economic theories of tort law] is
whether any perspective that assumes such a uniformity of
thought and conduct among the human participants in the tort
system is not flawed at the outset. Even if efficiency is to be a
paramount social goal, problems remain. I take it that [eco-
nomic tort theorists] would [not] suggest that persons choosing
to be inefficient should invariably be punished for the choice:
there would concededly be times when efficiency considerations
would yield to other values. But since [a purely economic] ap-
truncated tort law teach us about the social responsibility of American business? What would
this truncated tort law teach us about the inherent worth of human life and correlative issues
like human suffering, loss of companionship, and mental distress?
33. T. SCHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 42 (1985). See generally Rooney,
Environmental Economics, 1 U.C.L.A. J. OF ENVIRTL. LAW AND POL'Y 47, 63 (1980); E.F.
SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL 40 (1973).
34. See Priest, supra note 1, at 22-23.
35. Professor Priest goes on to note that "(mlodern tort law would be more effective if
courts were to focus more rigorously on exactly what can and cannot be achieved in terms of
accident reduction." Id. at 22 (emphasis provided). It is hard to see any conceptual difference
between Priest's disclaimer of the "efficiency norm" on the one hand, id., and his concern for
tort law being "more effective," on the other hand. Id. In fact, the definition of "effective"
("[h]aving the intended or expected effect; serving the purpose") and "efficient" ("[h]aving a
direct effect; causative; acting or producing effectively with a minimum of waste, expense, or
unnecessary effect") are synonymous. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 416 (1969).
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proach [does not] provid[e] any criteria for determining when
efficiency should yield to other values, one is supposed to assume
that a decision for efficiency has presumptively been made. But
if one is concerned about the validity of that decision itself or
about how comprehensively an efficiency standard should be ap-
plied, or whether economic models adequately characterized the
bulk of tort cases . . . [economic] theories provide no help.36
Thus, even if Priest's monolithic theory is assumed to have a degree of in-
ternal consistency, it still fails to appreciate the vital distinction between
social goals and social values. As noted by Professor Summers: "[t]he reali-
zation of a legal goal may or may not fulfill a value; that is, the realization
of a goal may itself be either good or bad."37
Second, and closely related to the first point, Professor Priest is mis-
informed about the limited number of goals that should be served by tort
law in a modern and diverse society. As a consequence of his narrow view
that accident prevention is the only worthwhile goal of modern tort juris-
prudence, Priest comes to unsupportable conclusions about the suitability of
several legal rules. Priest's error is not uncommon since "most people do
considerably simplify making . . . choices by looking at only one face of a
policy issue."3'8 The source of his particular error is a uni-dimensional focus
on economic efficiency to the exclusion of other values. A more enlightened
- albeit complex - approach should recognize that "there will be no sim-
ple, singular goal for a rule or other legal precept. The goals figuring in a
given form of law are multiple and may be classified along a continuum of
ascending generality.""8
Despite his major thesis that tort law should be limited to one over-
arching goal, Priest acknowledges that tort law might reflect a multiplicity
of goals. This acknowledgment is revealed by Priest's discussion of decisions
that have posited economic rationales of injurer incapacitation and safety-
related technology inducement4 as appropriate goals. His glib characteriza-
tion of these competing goals as "easily put aside" because of their "highly
36. G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 223 (1980) (criti-
cizing certain efficiency theories of tort law suggested by Richard Posner and Guido Cala-
bresi). See Posner, Strict Liability - A Comment, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 205 (1973); A Theory of
Negligence, I J. LEG. STUD. 29 (1972). See also Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test For
Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
37. R. SUMMERS, supra note 25, at 63.
38. S. KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A HOPEFUL VIEW OF AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT 27 (1987).
39. R. SUMMERS, supra note 25, at 65. See also D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A
STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 23-36 (1970) (public
policy decisions involve a multiplicity of values, instability and fluidity of values, conflicts
among values, combinations of values, and social disagreement on values).
40. Priest, supra note I, at 9.
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speculative" and insubstantial empirical basis41 is, at least partially, contra-
dicted by a later ambiguous statement that "[p]erhaps at some later point
in the refinement of a novel tort law regime, effects on activity levels and
safety research and innovation may become relevant. '4 2 This proviso to his
ostensibly "unified" theory43 raises more questions than it answers. What
conditions would Priest place on a "later . . . refinement" of his monolithic
theory? By what criteria would he judge whether or not the incorporation
of additional economic goals would be "relevant"? Would it be feasible or
desirable for courts and legislatures to later incorporate these ends into a
coherent approach? What threshold of empirical confidence would he deem
necessary to consider an expansion of his model?
Similarly, Professor Priest confuses his thesis in analyzing other poten-
tial non-economic goals of tort law: "the moral concerns of corrective jus-
tice and retribution."" The first source of this confusion is his historical
argument that "modern tort law, both as conceived by its founders in the
1960s and as elaborated over succeeding years, has ignored [these] moral
concerns . . . entirely." ' Is it his contention that most post-war jurists and
theorists reject moral purposes for tort law? Or does he mean to say that
while some courts and thinkers have been concerned about moral goals they
are, nevertheless, outside of the mainstream and, therefore, should be
ignored?
A second source of confusion in Professor Priest's comparison of moral
goals and economic goals is his normative argument - said to be "a
stronger reason than [his] historical argument" '46 - that "[a]ccident reduc-
tion and insurance are the only important economic effects a legal rule can
have."' 47 Presumably, this statement derives from his previous paragraph's
cryptic pronouncement that while "accident reduction and compensation of
the injured are totally instrumental in nature," the moral concerns of cor-
rective justice and retribution are "non-instrumental goals."4 8 In support of
this sweeping distinction Priest argues as follows:
A legal rule can influence investments in loss prevention up to
the point that such investments are cost-effective. Where dam-
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 6.
44. Id. at 9.
45. Id. But Priest equivocates on his textual statement in a footnote that acknowledges
"the importance of the legal heritage of corrective justice as it has influenced the forms of
modern law," id. n.38, in reference to his discussion of products liability law and causation
law.
46. Id. at 9.
47. Id. (original emphasis).
48. Id. at 8-9 (emphasis provided).
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age measures are compensatory, however, there is a very definite
ceiling to the preventive investments that any provider will
make. Beyond that point, legal liability serves only to provide
insurance for losses that cannot be practicably prevented. Thus,
even if a court were to define a legal rule on corrective justice or
retributive grounds, the effect of the rule on the parties subject
to it would only be to encourage greater investments in accident
reduction or in insurance, or both. The only important economic
effects that any legal policy can have are effects on the accident
rate and on the level of insurance provided for losses that are not
practicably preventable.4
But Priest's normative reasoning that accident reduction and insurance
efficiency are the only important goals served by tort law is unpersuasive in
several respects: (1) it fails to define the core concepts "cost. effective" and
"practicably preventable," and therefore is totally relativistic; (2) it is cir-
cular in nature since the argument assumes, without justification, that "in-
strumental" goals are identical to "economic" goals; and (3) it ignores the
disabling function that law may serve in particularly egregious situations of
corporate misconduct.50 While accident prevention and insurance effective-
ness are undeniably significant, the goals figuring into tort law are multiple
and not easily classified along a "continuum of ascending generality." 5'
Without attempting to undertake a complete cataloging or ranking at this
time, other tort theorists have recognized the following goals as being wor-
thy of careful consideration by decisionmakers in determining liability for
tortious injury and determining the appropriate level of damages: (a) up-
holding current ideas of fairness by scrutinizing, to the extent possible, the
defendant's "acts, motives, and state of mind"; 52 (b) facilitating administra-
tive convenience of the courts, in affording redress of wrongs;53 (c) distrib-
uting the loss on the party better able to bear it by "pass[ing] it along and
distribut[ing] it in smaller portions among a larger group" through such
49. Id. at 9 (original emphasis).
50. Indeed tort law can serve an important complementary function to criminal law for
corporate misconduct. An example of the disabling function of tort law includes removal of
key industrial decisionmakers from the marketplace as a result of the collateral impact of a
court judgment on shareholder's confidence in management's ability. Another example of this
function is redistribution of corporate assets into public interest litigation projects focused on
removal of unsafe products from the marketplace. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON & D. OWENS, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 7-15 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]. See also F. COLLEN, W. MAAKESTAD & G. CAVENDAR,
CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK: THE FORD PINTO CASE AND BEYOND 309-53 (1987)
(discussing punitive legal sanctions against lawless corporations).
51. R. SUMMERS, supra note 25, at 64.
52. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 50, at 21.
53. Id. at 23-24.
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means as "rates, prices, taxes or insurance"; 4 (d) providing an admonitory
incentive to similarly situated defendants to prevent the occurrence of phys-
ical or property harm through vigilance and foresight when "the producer
and the consumer do not have equal information about the risks of a given
product";5 5 (e) vindicating a plaintiff for a wrong when compensation is not
entirely satisfactory in situations where irreparable injury has occurred;56
and (f) channeling individual retaliation and violent emotion away from
self-help remedies for a perceived wrong into peaceful, socially acceptable
channels of dispute resolution."
Third, Professor Priest;s vision of modern tort law is flawed in his ex-
pectation that judges and juries will be able to magically decide tort cases
by asking one deceptively "simple," talismanic, question: "Is it possible to
identify any specific cost-effective action that either the injurer or victim
could have taken which would have prevented the accident?" ' Indeed, if
post-hoc evaluation of the actual cause and effect relationship often proves
to be an arcane task for judges and juries, Priest's call for a determination
of hypothetical cause and effect (i.e., what "would have prevented the acci-
dent") verges on the metaphysical. Moreover, in the real world of corporate
decisionmaking that often evolves over decades and entails complex interac-
tions among numerous policy actors and product configurations, it would be
impossible to reduce these complexities to a simple litmus test without de-
priving tort plaintiffs of any chance of prevailing on the merits. Priest's call
54. Id. at 24-25.
55. G. WHITE, supra note 36, at 218. See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 50, at
25-26.
56. G. WHITE, supra note 36, at 237.
57. Id. For other summaries of the broad social goals traditionally served by tort law,
see generally Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 137 (1951);
J. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 1-2 (2d ed. 1985); P. SCHUCK, SUING
GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 16-25 (1983).
[Plublic tort law [involved when suing the government] implicates five primary social
goals or constraints: to deter wrongdoing, to encourage vigorous decisionmaking by offi-
cials, to compensate victims of official misconduct, to exemplify society's moral principles,
and to achieve institutional competence and legitimacy. Each remedy affects each of
these, as well as the balance between them, somewhat differently; each also taps judicial
energies in distinct ways. This implies, then, a sixth goal: to achieve the optimal mix of
these other preeminent values.
Id. at 16. See also Smith, The Critics and "Crisis".- A Reassessment of Current Conceptions
of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765 (1987) (dispute resolution should be viewed as the
objective of tort law, whereas compensation, deterrence, or punishment are merely means to
achieve the primary end); Rabin, Some Reflections on The Process of Tort Reform, 20 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming) (tort law has always reflected a wide array of divergent goals).
For expansive discussions of the philosophy of social goals, see generally GOALS FOR
MANKIND: A REPORT TO THE CLUB OF ROME ON THE NEW HORIZONS OF GLOBAL COMMU-
NITY (E. Laszlo ed. 1977); G. FEINBERG, THE PROMETHEUS PROJECT: MANKIND'S SEARCH
FOR LONG-RANGE GOALS (1969).
58. Priest, supra note 1, at 20-21.
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for such a litmus test assumes that a judge or a jury should be in a position
to answer questions of accident prevention to a degree of scientific certainty
that is rarely seen in modern tort litigation. As noted in an analogous con-
text by an attorney involved in a recent celebrated toxic tort case, juries
have traditionally expressed community norms by focusing on probabilities,
not absolute certainties:
[Tort plaintiffs should not be required] to prove to a scientific
certainty, causation. Scientists have a different theory of causa-
tion, it's much closer to the criminal liability standard "beyond
any reasonable doubt." Our job is to establish causation "at a
moment in time." At this moment in time, we ask the jury, take
the available information in front of you and answer the ques-
tion: What caused these injuries? That's a "more probable than
not" standard, 51 percent is what's required. And . . . those
kinds of judgments that scientists make are fine when the scien-
tists are in their own sphere. When we are in the legal realm,
where we need answers, you can't tell the people of the country,
. . . "we don't know to a scientific certainty beyond all reasona-
ble doubt exactly what did this, and another 50 years worth of
exposures will produce enough bodies for us to be certain."
That's not an answer. The law is more humane than that, and
the law says we've got to answer the question now."
Fourth, Priest's conception of modern tort law suffers from numerous
abstractions that fail to explain how the monolithic goal of accident preven-
tion could be achieved through specific legal precepts. 0 As mentioned
above, he has neglected to define or explain in any significant detail what is
meant by "practicably preventable" and "cost-effective"; therefore, it is dif-
ficult to understand how a fact finder would be able to apply his accident
prevention standard in concrete cases. Another significant definitional void
in his approach is the specific meaning of the terms "accident prevention"
and "accident reduction." 1 For example, while Priest suggests that the
proper approach in a product liability case is for a jury to "clearly focu[s]
attention on the specific changes in production or design that would have
prevented the injury," 2 he does not discuss the type of evidence that would
be relevant to such determination. More importantly, he additionally fails
59. Toxic Trials (P.B.S. television broadcast, February 25, 1986, statement of Tony
Roisman at 24, discussing proof problems for victims of Woburn, Massachusetts groundwater
contamination) (transcript on file with author).
60. See generally R. SUMMERS, supra note 25, at 72-73 (the importance of "means-goal
complexes" in the law and that an "abstract goal, standing alone, is not very meaningful").
61. Priest uses "accident prevention" in various contexts, see, e.g., Priest, supra note 1,
at 10-13, and the term "accident reduction" in other contexts. Id. at 5-9.
62. Id. at 23.
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to discuss the relative weight the fact finder should place on the probative
proof. Several questions arise as a result of Priest's lack of discussion in
these areas, such as, should better safety records of other manufacturers
using a different product design for a product similar to the one in dispute
be utilized to assess specific product changes that would have led to acci-
dent reduction or accident prevention? Should the safety records of other
manufacturers be considered if they were affected by variables such as sub-
stantially different geographic distribution, time of use, use of products by
different age groups, or other variables? If these variables caused a court to
exclude comparison safety records for similar products from evidence,
should a jury base its decision on expert testimony of "the specific changes
in production or design that would have prevented the injury"? Would an
expert opinion on such an issue be too speculative for admission into
evidence?63
Thus, in reviewing the various means suggested by Professor Priest in
manufacturing defect cases ("Were there alternative methods of production
that would have practicably prevented the injury?");" product design cases
("Could the manufacturer have practicably adopted some alternative design
or production method that would have prevented the accident?"); 5 and
manufacturer's duty to warn cases ("exactly which warnings ['about prod-
uct dangers manufacturers could practicably obtain and impart' that]
would have been effective for [a particular] consumer product us[e]" in
preventing an accident?)," one is left with the impression that such vague,
ambitious and inductive criteria for decisions would be totally unworkable
in real life cases.
Fifth, Professor Priest makes the erroneous assumption that the goals
of tort law should always include some desired behavioral change: fewer
accidents and optimally functioning insurance markets. But as pointed out
by Professor Summers, a behavioral model of law "applies to some, but by
no means to all, of the goals of law."6
For example, the immediate goals of many legal rules are to
63. "[S]ubjectivity of the [expert] witness interpretive standard can be fatal to the ad-
missibility of her testimony." E. IMWINKELREID, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 214 (1982) (citing State v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39, 48 (W. Va. 1979)) (interpretive
subjectivity bars admission of expert opinions based upon "mere possibility"). See also Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984): "[Eixpert opinion need not be admitted if
the court believes that an opinion based upon particular facts cannot be grounded upon those
facts." Id., citing Huguley v. State, 39 Ala. App. 104, 96 So. 2d 315 (1957), cert. denied, 266
Ala. 697, 96 So. 2d 319 (speed deduced from impact); Flores v. Barlow, 354 S.W.2d 173 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1962) (speed deduced from damaged condition of vehicles).
64. Priest, supra note 1, at 25.
65. Id. at 30.
66. Id. at 31-33.
67. R. SUMMERS, supra note 25, at 66-67.
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arrange for the payment of money or the provision of goods or
services to beneficiaries of public programs. Even the ultimate
goals of such rules may involve not behavioral change but the
nurturing of health and well-being, or the provision of museums,
concerts, and the like. The immediate goals of still another type
of law are simply to grant liberties - for example, the liberty to
dissent or to worship - without encouraging or discouraging
any particular form of such behavior. Of course, other precepts
may take as their goal the deterrence of (or provision of com-
pensation for) interference with such liberties.
Another familiar kind of law aims largely to preserve or
foster desired social attitudes, such as feelings of loyalty, alle-
giance, patriotism, and tolerance. Such attitudes may, but need
not, show themselves in behavioral changes.6"
The immediate goal of many tort rules is to provide an alternative
channel of full and complete redress for people who have been personally
injured or who have suffered property damage, without encouraging or dis-
couraging other remedies such as recovery of collateral first-party insurance
benefits, employer-provided contractual disability payments, or assistance
from relatives. A plausible intermediate goal of tort law is to foster positive
social attitudes toward the courts and the judicial process by upholding
such outcome-independent process values as public openness, process peace-
fulness, humaneness, and respect for individual dignity, procedural fairness,
and civic friendship.6o
Moreover, as also pointed out by Summers:
The behavioral directive model of legal means does not ap-
ply to most forms of law which are designed to excuse from,
invalidate, cancel, diminish, or qualify obligations. Consider, for
example, a law that diminishes responsibility for a homicide
committed when the killer is provoked and flies into a rage.
Such a law is not a behavioral directive to citizens on the "front
line" of daily interaction. Rather, it is both a concession to
human frailty and an acknowledgement of diminished culpabil-
ity. And it is, as such, addressed to legal officials.
Furthermore, the directive model does not felicitously apply
in those many situations in which judges and other officials are
68. Id. at 67.
69. For a discussion and synthesis of outcome-independent legal values, see Blomquist,
Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean
Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-Independent Values, 22 GA. L. REV.
- (1987) (forthcoming).
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called upon after the fact to "clean up a mess." . . . Judges may
then conceive their main task to be that of deciding (partly in
light of prior law) the dispute on its merits after the fact - not
that of guiding the future behavior of those or other parties. In
so deciding, judges almost invariably take into account legal
rules, principles, maxims, and substantive reasons scattered
through a line of prior authority. These considerations will fre-
quently not be reducible, directly or indirectly, to categorical be-
havioral injunctions, general or specific ...
In addition, much law that is behaviorally directive is only
contingently so. Such law directs steps - the steps required to
make a contract or a valid will, for example. This law is direc-
tive only insofar as individuals choose to avail themselves of the
benefits of contracting, making a will, or the like.7"
Thus, tort precepts such as comparative negligence, presumptions of
consumer ignorance about the workings of a particular product, and the
burden shifting dimension of the res ipsa loquitur rule, for example, are not
necessarily behaviorally directive but, rather, reasonable concessions to
human frailty and legal recognition of diminished responsibility. Likewise,
in situations where the resumption of production of a particular product is
unlikely, for example, the manufacturing by a pharmaceutical company of
DES or the manufacturing by an industrial product firm of asbestos tiles,
guiding the future behavior of those or other parties is less important than
deciding the dispute after the fact. Finally, since imperfect information
about court tort judgments and jury verdicts would still exist, regardless of
"rigorous" attention by the law to changing the behavior of providers of
goods and services, some providers would likely not choose to respond to
subtle judgments or suggested accident prevention measures reflected in
these decisions.
In light of these non-behavioral considerations about the workings of
tort law, the Priest approach seems too artificial and mechanistic to corre-
spond with the complex needs of the tort system as it has grown and
evolved over the years.
III. THE SHORTCOMINGS APPLIED - THE CASE OF HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCE VICTIMS
The shortcomings of Professor Priest's "reject[ion of] the insurance
function of tort law" and his preoccupation with the "goal of accident pre-
vention" 7' are poignantly demonstrated in the application of his ideas to
70. R. SUMMERS, supra note 25, at 68-69 (emphasis in original).
71. Priest, supra note 1, at 38.
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victims of occupational and environmental exposure to hazardous sub-
stances 72 - what many generically refer to as "toxic torts."
A The Insurance Problem
For several reasons, Priest's insurance analysis proves deficient in ex-
plaining the plight of hazardous substance victims and protecting their need
for full compensation for injuries suffered. First, given the "fundamentally
different" nature of toxic waste injuries73 as compared to "the individual-
ized, immediate wrongs for which, and through which, tort law devel-
oped, ' 74 it is highly unlikely that potential victims could rationally seek, or
insurance companies could rationally craft, appropriate first-party coverage
against such risks. These differences include "the ambiguous etiology of
many diseases associated with exposure to toxic substances and the long
latency periods between exposure and manifestation of injury.1176
Second, even assuming that with accumulated experience and data 71
72. It is customary to differentiate between exposure to hazardous substances while at
work and exposure to hazardous substances in a non-work setting. Generic damages posed to
workers due to occupational hazards include contact with chemical agents (particulates, gases,
vapors and liquids), physical agents (noise, temperature extremes and radiation), and mechani-
cal agents (equipment defects). Pier, Cowles, Key & Nothstein, Recognition and Evaluation
of Hazards, in Toxic TORTS: LITIGATION OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE CASES 15-26 (G. Noth-
stein ed. 1984). "In addition, the general public is exposed to dangers from contamination of
the environment outside the workplace. These dangers . . . include biological agents, air pollu-
tion, water pollution, and hazardous waste." Id. at 26. See generally id. at 26-39.
73. Developments in the Law of Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1603
(1986) (citing Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental
Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575,
575 (1983)).
74. Id.
75. Id. (citation omitted).
76. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), will aid in the development of detailed health assessments
for individuals exposed to the nation's worst hazardous waste sites. In § 110 of SARA, Con-
gress substantially amended § 104(i) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982) mandating comprehen-
sive health studies at Superfund sites by the federal Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR). ATSDR's new responsibilities involve four key activities:
First, ATSDR must prepare, within six months, a list of at least 100 hazardous
substances that are commonly found at NPL [National Priority List] sites and that pose
the most significant potential threat to human health. Within 24 months, the list is to be
revised and expanded by the addition of at least 100 more substances.
Second, the agency is required to prepare "toxicological profiles" for each of these
substances at a rate of no fewer than 25 per year. Such profiles are to include an analysis
of all available toxicological and epidemiological evaluations for a hazardous substance to
ascertain levels of human exposure that may trigger adverse health effects and, where
appropriate, an identification of toxicological testing needed to identify levels of exposure
that may cause health concerns.
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insurance companies could rationally develop risk pools of individuals prone
to incur environmentally or occupationally induced diseases, given the com-
plicated nature of treating these diseases and the associated high costs of
proper medical care and disability expenses, it is unlikely that private insur-
ers would be willing to offer adequate first-party insurance contracts with-
out requiring high premiums, high deductibles, or stringent co-insurance
provisions. While workers in high risk industries - such as chemical manu-
facturing or waste disposal enterprises - would be better able to obtain
first-party coverage through employer-provided policies than isolated indi-
viduals seeking insurance for the risk of incurring disabilities from random
environmental exposures (such as liver and kidney disease from drinking
contaminated groundwater or leukemia from exposure to fugitive emissions
from a chemical factory), it would be problematic whether all employers
would voluntarily agree to provide adequate coverage for their workers.
Priest readily acknowledges that workers and individuals should have a
"private obligation to obtain [first-party] insurance" 77 in these circum-
stances - presumably regardless of cost or unavailability.
Third, whatever private first-party insurance arrangements that could
be made would not provide a full measure of compensation for losses suf-
fered by employees exposed to hazardous substances in the workplace or by
individuals exposed to toxic materials in the environment. As Priest con-
cedes, first-party insurance does not provide for losses from pain and suffer-
ing78 which are typically substantial in toxic tort cases.7  Likewise, as al-
Third, for substances for inadequate data bases, ATSDR, in cooperation with the
director of the National Toxicology Program, [will initiate a program of research
designed to determine the health effects of such substances] ...
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the amendments require ATSDR to perform
health assessments for each facility on the NPL. "Health assessments" are broadly de-
fined to include analysis of the existence of potential pathways of human exposure, the
size and potential susceptibility of the community within the likely pathways, and a com-
parison of exposure to recommended exposure or tolerance limits. The purpose of the
assessment is to help determine whether action should be taken to reduce human expo-
sure to hazardous substances at the facility and to determine whether additional testing
or health surveillance is required.
D. HAYES & C. MAcKERRON, SUPERFUND II: A NEw MANDATE - A BNA SPECIAL REPORT
83 (1987) (citations omitted). While this new program of health assessment is noble and
worthwhile, it appears that accumulation of a reliable body of health assessment data will take
decades of study and analysis. Moreover, even when a reliable database is developed, it will be
problematic for first-party insurers to be able to identify risk pools of individuals (i.e., those
who are likely to suffer adverse health effects from exposure to hazardous substances) since
health data would tend to be retrospective, as opposed to prospective, in nature. Moreover,
insurance companies would have great difficulty in ascertaining whether particular individuals
were being exposed to or had been exposed to environmentally harmful substances at the time
they applied for first-party insurance coverage.
77. Priest, supra note 1, at 37.
78. Id. at 16.
79. See, e.g., Norwood v. Lazarus, 634 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) jury verdict
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luded to above, individuals suffering from disabilities incurred by exposure
to occupational or environmental hazardous substances typically face a long
and complicated period of recovery with the prospect of frequent hospitali-
zation, costly medical care, and permanent disability. Privately obtained
first-party insurance contracts, through deductibles and co-insurance, would
tend to shift much of these costs onto the victims.
Fourth, Priest's insurance analysis overlooks the systemic deficiencies
of existing public insurance and social welfare programs - arrangements
that he contends would provide a "supplemen[t]" to first-party insurance.8"
Contrary to his implication, in public programs such as the Social Security
Disability Insurance Program (SSDI), state workers' compensation pro-
grams, Medicare and Medicaid, and veterans' benefits, compensation for
injuries from hazardous substances "are addressed only obliquely" '8 1 and
several barriers for recovery from such public programs often exist for vic-
tims of hazardous substance exposure.82
of $9,350 in favor of child who was injured by ingesting lead-based paint on defendant land-
lord's premises upheld with no finding of bias or prejudice and awarding damages for pain and
suffering); Texas Construction Service Co. v. Allen, 635 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. App. 1982) (jury
verdict of $500,000, including pain and suffering damages, to a worker for injuries sustained to
his eyes when lime sprayed from defendant company's truck was held to be not excessive).
Damages for mental and emotional distress are closely akin to pain and suffering dam-
ages. Priest's first-party insurance scheme would, likewise, not allow for compensation of
mental distress in toxic tort litigation. "[T]oxic tort litigation often involves situations in which
there is a greatly increased risk of contracting cancer [and other chronic disabilities] as a
result of extended exposure to a toxic substance." Roeca, Damages, in Toxic TORTS: LITIGA-
TION OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE CASES, supra note 72, at 509. Accordingly, Priest's proposal
would tend to cut off victims of exposure to hazardous substances from full compensation for
mental anguish and anxiety about a posoible future disease or condition. Compare Lorenc v.
Chemirad Corp., 37 N.J. 56, 179 A.2d 401 (1962) (court recognized validity of a damage
claim for both the probability of future cancer and for the neurosis based on cancerphobia of a
physician who suffered severe burns on his hands from his exposure to ethylene which alleg-
edly had been improperly packaged by the defendant); Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 322
Pa. Super. 348, 469 A.2d 655 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (court allowed expert testimony as to
plaintiff's chances of contracting cancer from asbestos exposure since testimony was relevant to
the computation of damages); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 461 A.2d
184 (Law Div. 1983), 202 N.J. Super. 106, 493 A.2d 1314 (App. Div. 1985), affid in part,
modified in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987) (New Jersey residents are entitled to
recover damages of $5,400,000 for injury to quality of life caused by contamination of ground-
water with toxic wastes from landfill; residents can also recover for emotional distress; while
damages for cancerphobia are not allowed, medical surveillance damages are appropriate).
80. Priest, supra note 1, at 20.
81. T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 33, at 606. See generally id. at 604-06.
82. For example, as reported in the ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 225-26 (1980):
An analysis of the data collected by the Department of Labor in 1975 Survey of
Closed Workers' Compensation Claims suggests the difficulty of obtaining compensation
for a disease resulting-from an environmental exposure. Approximately 60 percent of
disease cases and 55 percent of heart cases for which compensation was eventually
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Fifth, Priest's insurance proposal proves deficient when the issue of
compensation for death from exposure to hazardous substances is consid-
ered. By way of illustration, under Priest's scheme of things, if parents pro-
cured a life insurance policy on the life of their child, they could collect on
the face amount of the policy if their child died from leukemia caused by
drinking water contaminated by triclorethylene.83 If private insurance ar-
rangements were not made, however, the parents would be barred from
seeking recompense for the anguish and loss of society on their own behalf,
or the lost future income of their child on behalf of the child's estate, unless
they could prove that the death "could .. . have been practicably pre-
vented prior to its occurrence." 84 In most cases, therefore, the parents
would receive zero compensation on their own behalf or on behalf of their
child since few parents obtain life insurance policies on the lives of their
children.85 Moreover, the standard of care to prevent groundwater contami-
nation - judged by the "practicability" benchmark of prior decades when
the waste is likely to have entered the groundwater - would tend to insu-
late the polluter from tort liability.
Finally, Priest's proposal to turn over the risk management component
of tort law to the insurance industry without concomitantly providing for
stricter regulation of the unsettling "financial dynamics of [the] insurance
[industry]" 86 is fundamentally flawed. In this regard, Priest ignores con-
vincing explanations of the financial instability of the insurance industry
including the suggestion "that specialty insurers, often in the form of cap-
granted were contested (a formal or informal hearing was held to resolve issues in the
claim). This situation is in marked contrast to accident cases, in which only 10 percent
are contested. Causality was the contested issue in 73 percent of occupational disease
cases - in only in 21 percent of accident cases.
Id., quoted from T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 33, at 605. For a discussion of the need for
administrative compensation schemes for toxic tort victims, see Developments, supra note 73,
at 1631-60. See also P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS 281-86 (1987).
83. This hypothetical is drawn from the plight of some of the victims in Woburn, Mas-
sachusetts, where within a half-mile radius eight children were diagnosed with leukemia. The
leukemia was suspected to have been caused by the presence of discarded industrial solvents
like trichloroethylenes and tetrachloroethylenes that leaked into the public drinking water sup-
ply. See Toxic Trials, supra note 59.
84. Priest, supra note 1, at 21.
85. See Priest, The Current Insurance Crises and Modern Tort Law, supra note 6, at
1546-47. In the case of the death of an adult family member from exposure to hazardous
substances, it would be intuitively more likely that some form of life insurance protection -
either employer provided or individually obtained - would provide recompense for surviving
family members. However, unless high benefit levels were selected by the insured, surviving
family members would not realize full and complete compensation for the loss of the dece-
dent's companionship and lost earnings.
86. Huber, Injury Litigation and Liability Insurance Dynamics, 238 SCIENCE 31, 35
(1987).
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tive companies owned by nonprofit associations, are prone to rush unwisely
into the market during the upswing of the [insurance] cycle, depressing
price below true cost by underestimating future payouts or overestimating
future investment earnings"; 87 indications "that the forecasting methods
used by insurance rating bureaus may help to sustain the [fluctuating] cy-
cles"; 88 the problem of "newcomers to the insurance business with fewer
sunk costs and less shareholder equity . . . periodically depress[ing] prices
below cost because they are more willing to gamble against the risk of their
own default"; 89 and the problems of "insurance companies [being] prone to
make large but essentially random errors in forecasting future losses, which
then trigger sharp adjustments because of the financial inertia inherent in
the insurance process." 90 Moreover, Priest does not consider the overarching
tendency of insurance companies to exhibit "herd psychology" - occa-
sioned by their current ability to "share a considerable amount of rate and
loss information" while enjoying "certain exemptions from antitrust super-
vision." 91 Thus, without addressing these serious flaws in the functioning of
the insurance industry under current regulatory law, Priest's proposal is
premised on incomplete analysis.
B. The Tort Liability Problem
For several reasons, Professor Priest's idea of a truncated tort liability
system would tend to cut off nearly all victims of hazardous substance expo-
sure from redress by the courts and relegate these victims to whatever first-
party insurance or public welfare benefits, if any, that might be available.9 2
First, Priest's liability standard - "was there a specific act that could prac-
ticably have been taken that would have prevented the accident?"93 - is
the functional equivalent of a drastically restricted, and exclusively availa-
ble, negligence standard. Second, Priest's liability standard - requiring a
hazardous substance victim to prove specific and practicable steps that
87. Id. at 34-35 (citing Harrington, Prices and Profits in the Liability Insurance Mar-
ket (paper presented at the Brookings Institution Conference on Legal Liability, Washington,
D.C., June 15, 1987)).
88. Id. at 35 (citing Venezian, Ratemaking Methods and Profit Cycles in Property and
Liability Insurance, 52 J. RISK INS. 477 (1985)).
89. Id. (citing Munch & Smallwood, Solvency Resolution in the Property-Liability In-
surance Industry: Empirical Evidence, 11 BELL J. ECON. 261 (1980); and Finsinger & Pauly,
Reserve Levels and Reserve Requirements for Profit-Maximizing Insurance Firms, in RISK
AND CAPITAL (G. Barber & K. Spremann eds. 1983)).
90. Id. (citing Harrington, supra note 87; Venezian, supra note 88; Munch &
Smallwood, supra note 89; and RISK AND CAPITAL, supra note 89).
91. Id. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1987, § Y, at 13, col. 1. Compare Chi. Trib., Nov.
2, 1987, § 4, at 10, col. I (liability insurance softens up; cycle of competition starts to bring
policy rates down).
92. See supra notes 71-91 and accompanying text.
93. Priest, supra note 1, at 21.
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would have clearly prevented the harm incurred - would require a showing
that is inappropriately rigorous when disposers and generators of toxic sub-
stances should reasonably be expected to anticipate general as well as spe-
cific risks of harm caused by "products and their wastes in our 'contempo-
rary complex industrialized society.' "9 This is true since, "[a]lthough
disposers and generators might legitimately be surprised when a specific
agent that they have processed is discovered to be a carcinogen [or a sub-
stance toxic in some other manner], most disposers and generators have
long been generally aware that chemical wastes are potentially carcinogenic
[or toxic in other respects]." 9
Third, Professor Priest would exacerbate the already formidable barri-
ers that such victims face in proving that the defendant's conduct was un-
reasonable or that the plaintiff's harm was foreseeable. "Unlike the genera-
tors and disposers themselves, neither the victims nor the courts have any
special expertise in evaluating the availability and expense of the latest
technology. Similarly, neither victims nor courts can accurately judge the
cost of options such as ceasing to manufacture products that generate toxic
waste or storing the waste at a different location."9 If proof of specific and
practicable steps that would have clearly prevented the harm incurred by
the victim were added to the preexisting difficulties of proof, plaintiffs and
their attorneys would likely be intimidated from initiating costly litigation
in the face of such Herculean burdens. Indeed, plaintiffs would have to rely
almost exclusively on time-consuming surveys of available literature
describing practicable and specific accident-prevention measures in a partic-
ular industry. In addition, expensive expert opinions on precautions would
be required by plaintiffs since proof of these matters would probably be
"unattainable through discovery because few of the relevant records or em-
ployees [would be] still available" 97 in cases involving industrial practices
many years in the past.
Fourth and finally, Priest's general notion that tort plaintiffs are often
in as good or better a position than business defendants to prevent tort acci-
dents is intuitively inapplicable to victims of hazardous substances. In light
of the great uncertainties that exist regarding pathways of exposure, dos-
94. Developments, supra note 73, at 1627 (citing Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.
3d 588, 610, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980)).
95. Id. at 1609. See also P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS IN-
DUSTRY ON TRIAL, 16, 79, 89, 106-20, 124-27, 142-44 (1985) (hazards of asbestos use and
exposure concealed by asbestos industry); P. Schuck, supra note 82, at 21-23 (scientific evi-
dence on dioxin, available for several years, strongly suggested that even at low levels dioxin
could be a virulent toxin); S. ENGELMAYER & R. WAGMAN, LORD'S JUSTICE (1985) (conspir-
acy of A.H. Robbins Company in covering up the risks presented by the Dalkon Shield).
96. Developments, supra note 73, at 1612.
97. Id. (citing Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters, and Disposers of
Hazardous Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REV. 949, 964 (1980)).
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age, and other matters, victims of hazardous substances are fundamentally
different from users of specific and visible products.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Priest's vision of the future of American tort law is flawed,
for it expects too much of first-party private insurance and public welfare
programs to provide adequate "pure nontort compensation"', while, con-
comitantly, it posits an unrealistic hope that judges and juries could bring
about an optimum level of accident prevention by focusing on what "practi-
cable" measures would have avoided an injury. Priest's theory also expects
too little of our common law heritage of tort law where judges have sought
to achieve a number of policy goals beyond vindication of individual rights
to achieve certain collective purposes such as deterring and punishing so-
cially injurious activity, facilitating an efficient allocation of social re-
sources, seeking social equity, expressing community cohesiveness, and aug-
menting the government's legislative, regulatory, and wealth-distributing
policies.
Professor Priest's approach, as applied to victims of hazardous sub-
stance exposure, proves to be particularly harsh since it overlooks market
failures of the present insurance system that would lead to inadequate com-
pensation at a fair and reasonable cost. His proposed liability standard
would also make it virtually impossible for such victims to sue in tort to
achieve a full measure of justice. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Priest's
analysis of the intellectual foundations of modern tort law ignores the po-
tential significance of recently enacted environmental statutes that impose
expansive liability on purveyors of hazardous substances as a source of
analogous authority for imposing stricter tort standards of liability when
human beings suffer personal injuries from exposure to these substances. 9
98. This phrase is derived from P. SCHUCK, supra note 82, at 288. Professor Schuck
uses the phrase in his discussion of the inadvisability of relying exclusively on administrative
regulation and compensation schemes to address mass toxic tort disasters. In a further com-
ment on this point that is germane to Professor Priest's ideas, Schuck notes:
[T]ort law can sometimes . . . achieve significant deterrence at an acceptable cost.
It would therefore be unwise, as well as politically naive, to abandon tort law altogether
in the almost vain hope that pure collective deterrence and pure nontort compensation
[through a comprehensive administrative scheme] would somehow solve the existing
problem.
Id.
99. Examples of federal environmental statutes imposing expansive liability on purveyors
of hazardous substances include the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liablity Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). This argument is derived from
Developments, supra note 73, at 1661 ("Courts should recognize that many of the rationales
supporting expansive liability in CERCLA cases apply in the same fashion to tort litigation
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On balance, therefore, the main ideas expressed in "Modern Tort Law
and Its Reform," while interesting and thought-provoking, are unpersuasive
and unworkable.
involving personal injuries caused by leakage of toxic waste"). The seminal article on the use
of statutes as judicial source material for development and growth of the common law is Lan-
dis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934), republished in
2 HARy. J. ON LEGIs. 7 (1965). See also Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits,
17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401, 405-26 (1968); Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50
HARV. L. REV. 4, 11-14 (1936) ("I can find in the history and principles of the common law
no adequate reason for our failure to treat a statute much more as we treat a judicial prece-
dent, as both a declaration and a source of law, and as a premise for legal reasoning"); Pound,
Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908); Freund, Interpretation of Stat-
utes, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 207 (1917); Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 3,
10-22 (1966).
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